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Effects of the New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit Shifting
by David L. Koontz and Jeffery M. Kadet
For the first time in eons, Congress has seen fit 
to change a basic rule for the sourcing of income. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) minced 
few words in its addition of a single sentence to 
section 863(b) that applies to sales or exchanges of 
inventory property (1) produced in whole or in 
part by the taxpayer in one country, and (2) sold or 
exchanged in another country. The United States 
can either be the country where the inventory 
property is produced or the country where it is 
sold.
The new sentence reads:
Gains, profits, and income from the sale or 
exchange of inventory property described 
in paragraph (2) shall be allocated and 
apportioned between sources within and 
without the United States solely on the basis 
of the production activities with respect to the 
property. [Emphasis added.]
With this change, income from the sale of 
inventory produced by a taxpayer will no longer 
be sourced at the location where any sales 
activities take place. Rather, the location, or 
locations, of production activities will be the sole 
determining factor. This change is effective for tax 
years beginning after December 31, 2017.
I. Why Was the Rule Changed?
Under the U.S. tax system, sourcing of income 
within or outside the United States has been, and 
will remain, important for two principal reasons. 
First, income source is the basis for the vitally 
important foreign tax credit limitation formula, 
which specifies the maximum foreign income 
taxes that may be used by a U.S. taxpayer to offset 
U.S. income tax. Second, a non-U.S. taxpayer will 
be subject to tax in the United States only on 
income that is either U.S. source or is effectively 
connected with the conduct of a trade or business 
within the United States. The determination of 
effectively connected income is very much 
dependent on sourcing rules.
David L. Koontz is a retired CPA who spent 25 
years working in offices in the United States and 
Asia as a tax partner in a major accounting firm. 
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in international taxation for several major 
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the University of Washington School of Law in 
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In this article, Koontz and Kadet discuss the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s new sourcing rule for 
sales of manufactured inventory property, which 
states that gross income from the sale or 
exchange of property produced by the taxpayer 
will be sourced at the place of manufacture. That 
is a departure from the old rule, which assigned 
gross income partially to the place of sale (the old 
title passage rule) and partially to the place of 
manufacture. They explain that in addition to 
closing a long-standing foreign tax credit 
loophole, this change gives foreign-based entities 
selling manufactured products in the United 
States a clear roadmap for avoiding U.S. tax on 
those sales. Also, it profoundly affects the many 
multinational profit-shifting structures that 
involve groups with manufacturing 
management, decision-making, and related 
functions within the United States, but which 
often use contract manufacturers outside the 
United States. When effectively connected 
income taxation applies, more gross income will 
be sourced within the United States and be 
taxable ECI. The authors argue that Treasury and 
the IRS should modernize reg. section 1.863-3 
and related rules to reflect not only this TCJA 
change, but also the business models using 
contract manufacturers that did not exist when 
the current regulations were issued.
Copyright 2018 David L. Koontz and 
Jeffery M. Kadet. 
All rights reserved.
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Despite those two principal reasons for the 
importance of sourcing rules, the committee 
reports explaining this change in law do not focus 
on how the change could affect either the FTC or 
the taxation of non-U.S. taxpayers. Rather, the 
House committee report merely says:
The Committee acknowledges that 
current administrative guidance, which 
sources sales income, in part, based on the 
place of destination rather than the place 
of production, may be appropriate in the 
context of our current tax system. 
However, the Committee believes this 
approach is not appropriate under a 
participation exemption system with 
lower tax rates. Rather than providing 
targeted relief to particular kinds of 
income, the Committee is instead 
reducing tax rates for all taxpayers, while 
also modernizing the U.S. system for 
taxing cross-border income. Therefore, the 
Committee believes changing present law 
in this area will more accurately measure 
foreign-source taxable income as part of 
providing a flatter, fairer, and simpler tax 
system.1
The committee is saying that the sourcing 
change is consistent with two of the TCJA’s 
fundamental changes: (1) the significant 
reduction of corporate rates, and (2) the 
participation exemption. But the committee 
leaves it to the reader to speculate why that might 
be so.
While the above reflects Congress’s 
explanation of good tax policy, we suspect that the 
amendment most likely reflects a desire to 
eliminate a long-standing loophole for artificially 
increasing a U.S. taxpayer’s ability to use foreign 
taxes to offset U.S. taxes. In brief, under the old 
rule and the long-standing regulations 
interpreting it, it was often possible for a U.S. 
taxpayer that is manufacturing products within 
the United States and selling them overseas to 
treat half of the gross profit as foreign source, 
thereby artificially increasing the available FTC 
limitation and using otherwise excess FTCs to 
reduce current U.S. tax payable. That result was 
allowed even if the taxpayer had no overseas 
branch or other foreign activities that contributed 
to the sale. By eliminating sales activities as a 
factor and sourcing income at the place of 
production, that loophole has been closed.2
II. Effect on Profit-Shifting Structures
A. ECI Taxation and Profit-Shifting Structures
The authors have written several articles 
focused on the application of ECI taxation to 
specific profit-shifting structures involving 
worldwide businesses that are centrally managed 
and conducted from the United States.3 Those 
structures typically exhibit three economic and 
operational factors:
1. value drivers in the United States;
2. control and decision-making in United 
States; and
3. lack of a foreign group member CEO 
and management outside the United 
States that are capable of operating an 
independent stand-alone business.
When applicable, ECI taxation would impose 
U.S. corporation tax at normal corporate rates4 on 
some portion of the shifted profits that 
multinational groups have recorded within their 
foreign group members established in zero- or 
low-taxed foreign jurisdictions (low-taxed foreign 
members). Note that this imposition of U.S. 
corporate tax on ECI is a direct tax on the low-
taxed foreign member. This contrasts with the 
indirect taxation that arises under the subpart F 
controlled foreign corporation rules or through 
1
H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, at 384.
2
For further discussion of this rule change, see Jasper L. Cummings, 
Jr., “Selective Tax Act Analysis: Subpart F and Foreign Tax Credits,” Tax 
Notes, Jan. 29, 2018, p. 653.
3
Jeffery M. Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting: The Approach 
Everyone Forgets,” Tax Notes, July 13, 2015, p. 193; Thomas J. Kelley, 
David L. Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting: Effectively Connected 
Income and Financial Statement Risks,” 221 J. Acct. 48 (Feb. 2016); Kadet 
and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected Partnership 
Status,” Tax Notes, Apr. 18, 2016, p. 335; Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-
Shifting Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” Tax 
Notes, June 27, 2016, p. 1831; and Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting 
Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 2,” Tax Notes, 
July 4, 2016, p. 85.
4
The rates are currently 21 percent (up to 35 percent before the 
TCJA), plus the 30 percent section 884 branch profits tax when not 
reduced or eliminated under an applicable tax treaty.
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transfer pricing adjustments when the taxpayer is 
a U.S. person.
A common feature of many profit-shifting 
structures is that a low-taxed foreign member 
sources its inventory directly from one or more 
contract manufacturers, whether related or 
unrelated, and sells it to customers around the 
world. As explained below, the low-taxed foreign 
member, despite the lack of its own 
manufacturing facilities, is economically the 
manufacturer, with this manufacturer status 
normally reflected contractually through the 
following mechanisms:
i. Holding intellectual property rights. The 
low-taxed foreign member will be a 
licensee or a participant in, respectively, a 
license or cost-sharing agreement that 
defines the IP rights held.
ii. Agreements with contract manufacturers. 
These agreements are typically more in 
the nature of service agreements. The 
party holding the intangibles (that is, the 
IP that allows production and 
trademarking of a specific product) directs 
the other party, which has the necessary 
plant, equipment, and personnel, to use 
those intangibles to produce the specified 
products. In the absence of such an 
agreement, the contract manufacturer 
would not be allowed to produce the 
product.5
iii. Intercompany agreements. Under 
intercompany agreements, other group 
members (typically located primarily 
within the United States) perform 
production activities for the low-taxed 
foreign member. Usually structured as 
service agreements, the service provider 
group member contractually purports to 
act as an independent contractor and not 
as a partner, agent, or in a joint venture 
with the low-taxed foreign member. 
Despite this contractual approach, the 
service provider often performs crucial 
business functions and makes business 
decisions for the low-taxed foreign 
member. These are functions and 
decision-making that the low-taxed 
foreign member typically has neither the 
capacity nor the personnel to either 
conduct itself or competently direct 
service providers to perform.
In short, under these arrangements, the low-
taxed foreign member is not simply purchasing a 
product for resale. Rather, directly or indirectly, it 
conducts manufacturing and assumes most of the 
same production and commercial risks that any 
manufacturer assumes, and is, in fact, the 
manufacturer. Because these low-taxed foreign 
members are both producing and selling, section 
863(b) is relevant when two jurisdictions are 
involved and either the production or selling 
activities occur within the United States.
Profit-shifting structures often involve a low-
taxed foreign member (including its disregarded 
entity subsidiaries6) that is taxed either nowhere 
or at low effective tax rates in the countries where 
it conducts operations. These structures also 
conveniently sidestep the CFC rules by avoiding 
purchases from and sales to related group 
members.7 Thus, before the effective date of the 
TCJA, and ignoring any potential ECI taxation, no 
U.S. tax would have been paid currently on the 
low-taxed foreign member’s profits.8
5
As an example of a contract manufacturing arrangement, see 
Facebook’s 2017 Form 10-K at 24. The Form 10-K sets out clearly the 
group’s use of third parties to manufacture its Oculus products, as well 
as the various production and other commercial risks the group faces.
6
Reg. section 301.7701-2(c)(2). Unless otherwise noted, any reference 
in this article to the low-taxed foreign member includes the assets, 
personnel, and activities of any disregarded entity subsidiaries that are 
treated as divisions or branches for U.S. tax purposes.
7
More than just U.S.-based multinational groups are involved in 
profit-shifting structures. When, for example, an inverted multinational 
based in Ireland uses a low-taxed foreign member that records sales of 
inventory property as part of a profit-shifting structure, that low-taxed 
foreign member will often be owned directly or indirectly by the Irish 
parent. In that case, no income will be created under either sections 951 
or 951A, meaning that the subpart F and GILTI rules will be irrelevant. 
For an example of planning using non-CFCs by an inverted group, see 
the discussion of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc.’s 
acquisitions and subsequent internal operations concerning Medicis 
Pharmaceutical Corp., Bausch & Lomb Holding Inc., and Salix 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. from pages 19ff of the majority staff report 
prepared for hearings before the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
“Impact of the U.S. Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and 
Jobs” (July 30, 2015).
8
Of course, if a dividend were paid to a U.S. shareholder before the 
effective date of the TCJA, U.S. tax would be paid.
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After the TCJA’s effective date (and again 
ignoring any potential ECI taxation), the global 
intangible low-taxed income9 provisions could 
result in current U.S. tax at an effective rate of 
roughly half the domestic 21 percent corporate tax 
rate. That lower effective tax rate will cause many, 
if not most, multinationals to continue existing 
profit-shifting structures and will likely 
encourage many new ones. Even the 
Congressional Budget Office in its April 2018 
Budget and Economic Outlook concluded that the 
TCJA will have only a minor effect on the 
approximate $300 billion of profits it estimates are 
shifted each year out of the U.S. tax base. The CBO 
estimates that the TCJA will reduce this $300 
billion by only $65 billion, with a third of that 
reduction (say $20 billion to $25 billion) relating to 
IP transfers into zero- and low-taxed countries. 
These IP transfers are integral to the profit shifting 
that is a focus of this article. (Note that about half 
of this $65 billion estimated reduction arises from 
TCJA provisions focused on profit shifting that 
involves debt and its related interest charges.10)
Multinationals that have created profit-
shifting structures include:
1. U.S. multinationals;
2. former U.S. multinationals that have 
inverted;
3. former U.S. multinationals acquired by 
private equity and other investment funds 
through foreign acquisition vehicles; and
4. former U.S. multinationals acquired by 
foreign multinationals that leave U.S. 
management intact.
The low-taxed foreign members of 
multinationals in the first category will almost 
always be CFCs and subject to the CFC rules as 
well as the new GILTI rules. However, for the 
other three categories, the low-taxed foreign 
members will normally be owned by foreign 
group members so that there is no coverage by the 
CFC and GILTI rules.11 Because of this, for the 
other three categories, the new GILTI rules will 
not at all discourage these profit-shifting 
structures in the future. Further, these structures 
will seldom, if ever, involve any outbound 
related-party payments from U.S. group 
members, meaning that the new base erosion 
minimum tax12 will have no effect.
In summary, aside from potential ECI 
taxation, most multinationals will have no reason 
to either discontinue existing profit-shifting 
structures or refrain from initiating new ones.
B. Basis for ECI Taxation
As noted above, a low-taxed foreign member 
within a profit-shifting structure may hold IP 
rights allowing it to manufacture products or to 
rely on others, such as contract manufacturers, to 
do so. Often, the low-taxed foreign member has 
neither the physical assets (for example, plants 
and equipment) nor knowledgeable personnel 
that would make it capable of either 
manufacturing the products on its own or 
directing a contract manufacturer to produce 
them. So without either physical assets or 
personnel, how does such a low-taxed foreign 
member operate? How does it acquire the 
products that it will sell to its distributors and 
customers around the world?
9
Detailed discussion of GILTI is beyond the scope of this article. See 
sections 951A and 250.
10
See the CBO’s April 2018 Budget and Economic Outlook, at 124-127. 
This report makes clear the CBO’s doubt that there will be any significant 
reduction of profit shifting. From page 125:
CBO estimates that the reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate, 
combined with the new [GILTI] rules governing the treatment of income 
from high-return investments (much of which is derived from IP), will 
reduce corporations’ incentives to shift profits by transferring IP outside 
the United States. However, that effect is expected to be modest. IP is 
especially easy to relocate, so MNCs are typically able to locate it in 
whichever affiliates face the lowest tax rate on the income that it 
generates. Because tax havens outside the United States will continue to have 
relatively low tax rates, CBO projects that most IP currently located will remain 
there. For newly created or future IP, the changes resulting from the tax act and 
the fixed costs of transferring IP to foreign affiliates will probably deter some 
small amount of profit shifting. [Emphasis added.]
11
For the other three categories, there will be situations where a low-
taxed foreign member is partially owned by one or more U.S. group 
members. Even where the U.S. ownership is less than 50 percent, the 
TCJA’s repeal of section 958(b)(4) may have the effect of causing those 
group members to be CFCs. Despite such a CFC classification, the 
directly foreign-owned portion should remain protected from any 
subpart F or GILTI taxation.
12
See section 59A and Kadet and Koontz, “Internet Platform 
Companies and Base Erosion — Issue and Solution,” Tax Notes, Dec. 4, 
2017, p. 1435.
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Over the past few decades, technological and 
other digital developments13 have allowed many 
multinational groups with worldwide businesses 
centrally managed from the United States to 
create supply chains that include important 
production and sales functions conducted in 
multiple countries. In some cases, although 
physical manufacturing may be conducted in 
plants and facilities around the world (with those 
plants and facilities often being owned and 
operated by unrelated contract manufacturers), 
almost by necessity, many if not all significant 
production activities (short of the physical 
production) are carried out by U.S.-based 
personnel. In those situations, U.S.-based 
personnel are responsible for and actually 
conduct production activities for the group’s 
worldwide operations — that is, they plan, 
manage, and carry out production activities for all 
group members that hold IP exploitation rights 
for various geographic regions. For example, 
personnel based within the United States make 
business decisions and conduct production 
activities that directly allow (1) one or more U.S. 
group members to manufacture or have 
manufactured the products that they sell to U.S. 
customers, and (2) one or more low-taxed foreign 
members to manufacture or have manufactured 
the products that they sell to customers in non-
U.S. geographic territories.
Most importantly, this means that the 
activities of these personnel directly benefit, and 
are carried out for and on behalf of, multiple 
group members, thereby representing the joint 
production of products by these multiple group 
members. Also, in many cases the products being 
physically produced by contract manufacturers 
will not be identified as being produced for, or 
owned by, any specific group member until either 
late in the production process or until they’ve 
been packed for shipment to a customer.
What are these joint production activities and 
functions that are short of actual physical 
production?14 They include, for example:
1. oversight and direction of production 
activities;
2. material selection, vendor selection, 
control of raw materials, work-in-process, 
or finished goods;
3. management of manufacturing costs or 
capacities;
4. control of manufacturing-related 
logistics; and
5. quality control.
With two or more group members involved in 
joint production, the IRC’s partnership rules, 
regulations, and a litany of case law come into 
play. In short, joint production activities are more 
than enough to create a partnership for U.S. tax 
purposes. This finding of a partnership will be 
even more obvious when there is a central 
management function (including product sales 
management) that presents the group’s business 
to customers, distributors, and others as one 
seamless worldwide business and that makes 
innumerable business decisions affecting that 
business (for example, determining production 
quantities, terms for transactions with third 
parties, and product pricing).
Interested readers may refer to our previously 
cited article for an explanation of how a profit-
shifting structure may create a partnership for 
U.S. tax purposes.15 In short, that article notes that 
many profit-shifting structures involve one 
worldwide, centrally managed and conducted 
business, the operations and transactions of 
which have been separated into multiple group 
members with each member conducting defined 
portions of that business. The article explains how 
in many cases the group members are partners in 
an unacknowledged partnership for U.S. tax 
13
For considerable discussion of these developments and their effects 
on cross-border commerce, see OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From 
Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS,” in 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, 
Paris). See also Section II of Kadet, “BEPS: A Primer on Where It Came 
From and Where It’s Going,” Tax Notes, Feb. 15, 2016, p. 793.
14
See reg. section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv)(b), which is the source for this 
listing. While in some cases there will be overlap with research and 
development work, these production activities and functions are in fact 
separate from R&D. Thus, special rules governing R&D such as the cost-
sharing agreement regulations and the entity classification rules do not 
apply. See reg. sections 1.482-7(j)(2)(iii) and 301.7701-1(c).
15
See Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected 
Partnership Status,” supra note 3.
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purposes. Suffice it to say that the existence of a 
partnership, while not a necessity, simply makes 
the application by the IRS of ECI taxation more 
certain and considerably easier to implement.16
Once there is a partnership with the relevant 
U.S. and foreign group members as partners, all 
joint activities and related revenue and expenses 
are considered to be conducted, earned, and 
incurred within the partnership and no longer 
conducted, earned, and incurred by any of the 
partners.17 This means that the relevant low-taxed 
foreign member or members are partners in a 
partnership that is conducting a trade or business 
within the United States that is partially or wholly 
producing inventory property in the United 
States for sale outside the United States.18 Under 
these circumstances, low-taxed foreign member 
partners will be treated as engaging in a trade or 
business within the United States19 and will have 
some amount of ECI, for which they must file 
Form 1120-F (U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign 
Corporation) and pay applicable U.S. corporate 
income tax. The partnership must apply section 
1446 withholding tax.
It will often be the case that U.S. group 
members, acting independently on a regular and 
continuing basis, make business decisions and 
negotiate and conclude important terms of 
contracts on behalf of their low-taxed foreign 
members. These independent actions cover 
matters such as component and raw material 
sourcing, contract manufacturing agreements, 
production planning, overseeing the 
manufacturing process, and quality control. Thus, 
even if no partnership exists for tax purposes, the 
facts may establish that U.S. group members are 
de facto agents acting on behalf of their low-taxed 
foreign members, thereby creating a trade or 
business within the United States with some 
amount of ECI. De facto agency status is sufficient 
to meet the “trade or business in the United 
States” test for application of the ECI rules.
C. Before TCJA
Section 863(b) and relevant regulations in 
effect before the TCJA provide for sourcing of 
applicable gross income from production and 
sales by attributing one portion to production 
activity and the remainder to sales activity. While 
not the only method set out in the regulations,20 a 
commonly used approach is the 50/50 method, 
under which gross income is apportioned one-
half to production activity and one-half to sales 
activity. While the production activity portion is 
sourced based on the location of production 
assets,21 the sales activity portion is governed by 
the long-standing sourcing rule that looks to the 
country in which the sale occurs — the title 
passage rule.22 Under those rules, even if a 
product was wholly produced within the United 
States and no actual sales activities were 
performed by the taxpayer outside the United 
States, one-half of the gross income was treated as 
foreign source as long as the sale was foreign 
source under the title passage rule. This is the 
costly loophole that the TCJA section 863(b) 
amendment closes.
Consider a profit-shifting structure in which a 
low-taxed foreign member and one or more other 
group members are partners in a partnership that 
manufactures and sells inventory property. Most 
likely the structure was created, of course, with 
the group’s management and its advisers either 
ignoring or overlooking the very real possibility 
that their jointly conducted business activities 
have created a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. 
(Even if no partnership was found to exist for tax 
purposes, there would likely be a de facto agency 
relationship between the low-taxed foreign 
member and one or more U.S. group members 
16
The authors are unaware of any IRS attempt to assert an 
unintended partnership in a profit-shifting structure. However, the 
actual facts regarding how members of some groups operate joint 
businesses might be so strong that those groups may, after a careful 





Note that under the code, regulations, and case law, there will still 
be a partnership with production occurring within the United States 
even when the partnership activities are limited to joint production with 
each partner taking its share of production as a distribution in kind for 
sale by that partner. Thus, although many centrally managed groups 
conducting joint production also direct and conduct sales activities 
centrally, the performance of these centrally directed sales activities are 
not necessary for the results described in this article.
19
See section 875(1). Activities conducted within the United States 
will usually be more than sufficient to cause a permanent establishment 
when a tax treaty applies.
20
See reg. section 1.863-3(b) and (g)(2).
21
See reg. section 1.863-3(c)(1) and (g)(2).
22
See reg. sections 1.863-3(c)(2), (g)(2), and 1.861-7(c).
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acting on its behalf.) Except as noted in the below 
discussion, this partnership conducts all 
production activities within the United States and 
sells the inventory property both within and 
outside the United States. Assume also that 
physical production of the inventory property is 
performed by an unrelated contract manufacturer 
outside the United States.
Under the pre-TCJA sourcing rules, and using 
the 50/50 method, the gross income from foreign 
sales would result in 50 percent of the gross profit 
being U.S. source and 50 percent being foreign 
source.23 This has the following consequences for 
the low-taxed foreign member partner:
1. Because the U.S.-source income is ECI at 
the partnership level,24 the portion of ECI 
allocable under section 704 to the low-
taxed foreign member partner is subject to 
both section 1446 withholding and normal 
corporate taxation at a rate of up to 35 
percent.25 The 30 percent section 884 
branch profits tax would also apply if not 
reduced or eliminated under an applicable 
tax treaty.
2. When the low-taxed foreign member 
partner is a CFC, the manufacturing 
branch rule26 will likely apply to cause 
some portion of the partnership’s foreign-
source income allocable to that partner to 
be currently taxable under subpart F to the 
U.S. shareholder.27
D. After TCJA
Once the TCJA is effective, changes that will 
affect the above-described profit-shifting 
structure include:
1. sourcing of income from covered 
inventory property transactions solely to 
the location or locations of production 
(section 863(b) amendment);
2. taxation of GILTI; and
3. reduction of the corporate tax rate to a 
flat 21 percent rate from its previous rates 
of up to 35 percent.
These changes result in the following 
consequences for the low-taxed foreign member 
partner:
1. With a finding that all the partnership’s 
production activities are conducted within 
the United States (the related contract 
manufacturer’s assets and activities 
outside the United States are ignored for 
this purpose because they are not assets of 
the partnership, but rather assets of the 
contract manufacturer), the full gross 
income from product sales will be U.S.-
source income28 and ECI at the partnership 
level. As with the pre-TCJA situation 
described above, the portion of ECI 
allocable under section 704 to the low-
taxed foreign member partner will be 
subject to section 1446 withholding; 
23
Note that the assets of the contract manufacturer outside the 
United States do not affect the source of income from production 
activities. Thus, under these assumed facts, all 50 percent of the gross 




See discussion in prior articles listed in supra note 3, covering both 
the potential loss of deductions and credits under section 882(c)(2) and 
open statute of limitations under section 6501(c)(3) when the low-taxed 
foreign member has not filed a tax return for a prior year.
26
See reg. section 1.954-3(b)(1)(ii).
27
In brief, with the manufacturing branch being in the United States, 
the manufacturing branch rule (reg. section 1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(b)) is 
applied comparing the effective tax rate on the relevant foreign-source 
sales income with 30 percent. This 30 percent is the lower of 90 percent 
of, or 5 percentage points less than, the 35 percent U.S. tax rate. With the 
profit-shifting structure minimizing the imposition of foreign taxes to 
very low rates, the manufacturing branch rule should apply to relevant 
foreign sales that are otherwise caught by the section 954(d)(1) definition 
of foreign base company sales income (FBCSI). Note also that not all 
foreign-source income will be FBCSI. For example, if the partnership or 
the low-taxed foreign member partner has a sales office in Singapore, 
inventory property sold for use, consumption, or disposition within 
Singapore would not be caught by the section 954(d)(1) FBCSI definition. 
However, sales into nearby Malaysia where there is no sales office would 
be caught.
28
The facts in this example assume that 100 percent of production 
activities occur within the United States. When the partnership conducts 
production activities and holds production assets outside the United 
States, some portion would be foreign source and avoid ECI taxation.
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normal corporate taxation, though now at 
the 21 percent flat rate; and the 30 
percent section 884 branch profits tax if 
applicable.
2. Because all gross income in this example 
is caught by the new section 863(b) 
sourcing rule and is therefore ECI, none of 
that income will be subject to the new 
GILTI rules29 when they would otherwise 
apply to a U.S. shareholder because the 
low-taxed foreign member is a CFC. The 
GILTI rules (as well as the subpart F rules), 
of course, recognize that when a CFC is 
taxable on ECI, there is no need to include 
that already taxed income in the income of 
any U.S. shareholder.
The above consequences assume that 100 
percent of the production activities occurred in 
the United States. Say instead that 25 percent of 
the partnership’s production assets are located 
outside the United States, thereby causing 25 
percent of the gross income from product sales to 
be foreign source.30 That would cause that portion 
of gross income to escape ECI taxation.
Assuming the low-taxed foreign member is a 
CFC, either the above-mentioned subpart F 
manufacturing branch rule or the GILTI rules 
would apply to its U.S. shareholders regarding 
the 25 percent of gross income that is foreign 
source. In short, the manufacturing branch rule 
could conceivably apply, with its application 
depending on the tax rate in the country where 
the partial manufacturing takes place and the 
effective tax rate paid on that income. When the 
manufacturing branch rule doesn’t apply, the 
income would be included in the U.S. 
shareholder’s GILTI computation. As for the 
applicable U.S. tax rate, when subpart F applies, it 
would be the flat 21 percent rate. When GILTI 
applies, the flat 21 percent rate is cut roughly in 
half. In either case, if foreign taxes have been paid, 
there would be some amount of FTC.31
III. Foreign Producer Sales Into the United States
The above sections of this article have focused 
on profit shifting conducted by groups having 
one or more low-taxed foreign members that 
partially or wholly produce products within the 
United States. The new section 863(b) sourcing 
rule will also affect legitimate foreign producers 
that sell their fully foreign-manufactured 
products into the United States.
Traditional tax planning wisdom has typically 
discouraged producers from setting up sales 
branches to sell their manufactured products 
within other countries. This has been true for 
various nontax reasons, including the desire to 
secure limited liability protection that shields the 
group from excessive legal risks arising from local 
operations. Thus, when a producer from one 
country desires to set up its own distribution or 
other sales support network that goes beyond 
some limited functions such as market research 
(in which case the foreign producer might 
establish a representative office), it will most 
commonly establish a local subsidiary. One 
important tax reason for this traditional planning 
is to establish a more secure transfer price that 
will better delineate the income attributable to the 
local sales and distribution functions. The foreign 
producer wants to minimize the risk that the local 
country will claim that some portion of the 
income attributable to production intangibles and 
the production process itself becomes a part of 
that local country’s tax base.
In brief, the use of a local subsidiary for the sale 
and distribution of products results in 
intercompany transactions that are reflected in 
legally enforceable contracts and other documents 
between group members. In contrast, when a 
foreign producer maintains a sales branch, there is 
an intracompany home office/branch transfer value 
that has only internally generated management 
documentation for support. Despite the self-serving 
nature of these legally enforceable contracts and 29See sections 951A(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 952(b).
30
See reg. section 1.863-3(c)(1) and (g)(2). Current regulations provide 
that the adjusted basis of production assets located within and outside 
the United States shall be used to determine U.S.-source and foreign-
source income from production activities. New regulations under 
section 863(b) that may be issued could set out other factors to determine 
source.
31
See section 960, including new section 960(d) added by the TCJA to 
allow a partial FTC for GILTI.
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documents, tax authorities understandably give 
them more credibility than the internally generated 
documentation.
For purposes of illustration, assume that a 
foreign widget producer has manufacturing and 
related administration costs of $50. It then sells 
the widget at a price of $80 to its U.S. sales 
subsidiary, which in turn sells the widget to a 
customer for $100, incurring $10 of local expenses 
in the process. This leaves groupwide profit of $40 
with $30 of profit in the foreign producer, which 
reflects the value of production including 
production intangibles; and $10 of profit in the 
U.S. sales subsidiary, which reflects the value of 
sales and distribution functions including local 
marketing intangibles. Assume that title transfers 
from the foreign producer to the U.S. subsidiary 
when the products are physically within the 
United States.
Before the new section 863(b) amendment, the 
title passage rule would govern the source of the 
foreign widget producer’s gross income that is 
attributable to its sales activity. Thus, some 
portion of the producer’s gross income would be 
U.S. source. Despite this U.S.-source status, the 
producer would under normal circumstances 
avoid any U.S. tax because the producer has 
neither a trade or business in the United States nor 
a permanent establishment under any tax treaty 
that might be applicable. This means that the 
United States would only tax the $10 of profit 
recorded within the sales subsidiary, allowing the 
foreign widget producer to protect its $30 of 
manufacturing profit from U.S. taxation (ignoring 
of course the potential for transfer pricing 
adjustments).
With the new section 863(b) sourcing rule for 
manufactured inventory property, 100 percent of 
the gross income from sales into the United States 
by foreign-based manufacturers will now be 
foreign source. For our foreign widget producer 
selling to its U.S. sales subsidiary at $80, this 
means that none of its $30 of profits would be ECI, 
even if the producer were found to be conducting 
a trade or business in the United States or to have 
a PE under an applicable tax treaty.
Say that before the section 863(b) amendment, 
the foreign widget producer had been selling into 
the United States through a U.S. sales branch 
rather than the assumed local subsidiary. With 
this conduct of a trade or business within the 
United States and some amount of U.S.-source 
gross income as determined under the section 
863(b) regulations, it would have been taxable in 
the United States on some portion of its $40 of 
groupwide profits.
Now, with the section 863(b) amendment, the 
foreign widget producer will have zero U.S.-
source gross income, meaning that all the profit of 
$40 will escape ECI taxation. As a corollary, of 
course, with all gross income being foreign 
source, the expenses of the sales branch 
attributable to it could not be attributed to and 
deductible against any other ECI that the widget 
producer might have from other activities it 
conducts in the United States.
Given the foregoing, traditional tax planning 
may no longer apply to foreign producers that 
wish to set up their own sales and distribution 
operations in the United States. For example, 
when a foreign producer’s home country exempts 
from taxation or taxes the profits of a foreign sales 
branch at very reduced rates, there will be an 
incentive to sell into the United States through 
such a branch — that incentive being little or no 
home country tax and no U.S. tax.
What other incentive might there be? Say that 
a foreign producer with a U.S. sales subsidiary 
has material intercompany sales that it believes 
are at some risk of a transfer pricing adjustment.32 
If it were to transition in some manner to a sales 
branch structure, the sourcing based solely on 
location of production would cause complete 
nontaxability, thereby sidestepping for the future 
any ongoing transfer pricing risk.
Needless to say, when an existing sales or 
distribution subsidiary holds marketing rights 
and intangibles, any restructuring may have 
significant transfer pricing, legal ramifications, 
and other consequences from their transfer, all of 
which are outside the scope of this article. 
However, when a foreign producer is initiating its 
own sales or distribution operations for the first 
time or is initiating separate operations for a new 
product line so that there is no transfer of exiting 
32
An excellent example of a foreign producer that received IRS 
attention is GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. See IR-2006-142.
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marketing rights or intangibles, establishing a 
sales branch should carry little or no U.S. tax risk.
U.S. groups in their profit-shifting structures 
have made aggressive use of the check-the-box 
rules33 to create hybrid entities that avoid or 
minimize tax in the foreign countries in which they 
operate. Also, the simple check-the-box rules allow 
foreign producers to create hybrid entities for U.S. 
sales and distribution operations that would be 
separate taxpayers under their home country tax 
rules and disregarded entity (DRE) subsidiaries 
under the U.S. tax rules. With DRE status and the 
new section 863(b) source rule, foreign producers 
would be able to easily avoid both their home 
country tax and U.S. tax. Treasury may need to 
consider issuing future antiabuse rules that would 
override such structures.
The above discussion covers only domestic U.S. 
rules. When a foreign producer is covered by a tax 
treaty with the United States, there could potentially 
be treaty terms that define source, though in general, 
treaties do not act to increase the tax that would be 
due in excess of amounts otherwise owed under 
domestic law. The potential applicability of any 
sourcing rule as well as the implications of having a 
PE under a treaty would require separate 
investigation.
IV. Intangible Products
This article has been written primarily with 
the production and sale of tangible products in 
mind. There are, however, many intangible 
products sold with one multinational group both 
producing and selling the product. An obvious 
example of such a product is software, which 
under the terms of reg. section 1.861-18 can be 
treated as the sale or exchange of a product when 
provided to customers.34 Any other intangible 
products included within the section 865(i)(1) 
definition of inventory property would also fall 
into this category.
V. Effect on Transition Tax
With the transition from the former deferral 
system to the new territorial participation 
exemption system mandated by the TCJA, section 
965 imposes a one-time tax on accumulated post-
1986 deferred foreign income on U.S. shareholders, 
payable at the election of the taxpayer in eight 
annual installments. Say that a U.S. shareholder of a 
zero- or low-taxed CFC has been making 
installment payments regarding that CFC’s 
accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income. 
Later, it is determined that for specific pre-TCJA 
years the CFC conducted a trade or business within 
the United States and had ECI subject to normal U.S. 
taxation.
In that event, with the determination that 
some portion of the CFC’s accumulated post-1986 
deferred foreign income is attributable to ECI, the 
tax base for the one-time transition tax would be 
adjusted downward.35
VI. Needed Amendment of Regulations
The amendment of section 863(b) requires at a 
minimum that changes be made to reg. section 
1.863-3 to explain and define how the new law is 
to be applied. This will provide an opportunity to 
modernize this regulation and others to reflect the 
business models now commonly used that did not 
exist many decades ago when the existing 
regulations were issued.36
Reg. section 1.863-3 now uses the adjusted 
basis and location of production assets owned by 
a taxpayer to determine the source of income from 
production activities. New business models have 
centralized production activities as well as 
production decision-making and management 
functions in the United States while relying on 
third-party contract manufacturers often located 
outside the United States. This creates an urgent 
need to update the section 863(b) sourcing rules. 
This update could both more fully define what 
should be considered as inventory property 
produced by a taxpayer and identify the factor or 
factors that would determine source. Any new 
rules that address business models using contract 
33
Reg. section 301.7701-1 to -3.
34
See reg. section 1.861-18(f)(2), which provides that section 863 will 
apply when appropriate to determine the source of income from 
transactions classified as sales or exchanges of copyrighted articles. See 





Several specific suggestions for updating existing regulations were 
included in Kadet and Koontz, supra note 12.
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manufacturers should be consistent with reg. 
section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv), which was amended 
effective from 2009 to focus on such business 
models for purposes of subpart F.37 Because 
contract manufacturing has been an important 
part of business models and profit-shifting 
structures for several decades now, it is long past 
the time to make similar changes to the ECI and 
sourcing rules. Modernization should include the 
production and sale of intangibles such as 
software. Antiabuse rules could also be amended 
to reflect today’s profit-shifting structures as well 
as to cover possible new structures such as those 
mentioned in the above section on foreign 
producer sales into the United States.
VII. Concluding Comments
In addition to the new sourcing rule applicable 
to both domestic and foreign taxpayers, the above 
discussion has highlighted several significant TCJA 
changes to the code, including a lower corporate tax 
rate, the participation exemption, and the GILTI 
provisions. But much has not changed. In short, 
although an oversimplification, it’s fair to say that 
much of the code and its myriad rules have 
remained basically intact while some new 
complicated layers have been added. This lack of 
change means that the existing ECI provisions are 
very much a constant for all years, whether pre- or 
post-TCJA.38 The move from the prior deferral 
system to the new territorial participation 
exemption system does not change this one iota, 
except for the new sourcing of income rule.
The IRS has made clear over the past few years 
that it does not like and is willing to challenge 
many profit-shifting structures now used by 
multinational companies. In doing so it has 
primarily used as tools either transfer pricing or 
recharacterization, both of which are subjective 
and carry considerable uncertainty of success in 
the inevitable litigation process.39 In contrast, 
when the facts support it, the existence of a 
partnership for tax purposes and the 
determination of ECI are relatively objective.
The authors have seen no evidence to date that 
the IRS has attempted to counter the effects of profit-
shifting structures through application of the ECI 
rules. If the IRS should decide to apply ECI in the 
future, taxpayers are unlikely to be able to rely on 
the statute of limitations to prevent application of 
the ECI rules to prior tax years. This is because for 
any tax years that the low-taxed foreign member 
failed to file its own separate tax return, those years 
remain open to examination. Low-taxed foreign 
members would not, of course, have been eligible to 
join with their U.S. affiliated group in the filing of a 
consolidated tax return. This means that when the 
facts justify it, the IRS has the authority to look back 
many years and assess tax, interest, and penalties. 
Unless a low-taxed foreign member actually filed 
Form 1120-F for a prior year that started the running 
of the statute of limitations for that year, that prior 
year will still be open. That is true even if that year 
has already closed for the U.S. affiliated group.40
Despite no apparent evidence of the 
application of ECI taxation to multinational 
profit-shifting structures, there is evidence that 
the IRS believes that ECI taxation is relevant and 
worth an increased investment in manpower and 
training. This is supported by the Form 1120-F 
nonfiler campaign included in the January 31, 
2017, rollout of the IRS Large Business and 
International Division’s initial 13 campaigns.
Considering the above, we recommend that 
multinationals using the types of profit-shifting 
structures discussed in this article and our previous 
articles reassess their facts and circumstances and 
consider whether such structures should be 
continued, modified to better align profits with 
value creation, or unwound.41 
37
In brief, reg. section 1.954-3(a)(4)(iv) provides rules for determining 
whether personal property sold by a CFC will be considered to have 
been manufactured, produced, or constructed by that CFC when the 
physical manufacturing, producing, and construction activities are not 
performed by the CFC. See also T.D. 9438.
38
The TCJA affects ECI taxation through the section 863(b) change 
discussed herein and even expanded it through the addition of section 
864(c)(8) concerning the sale or exchange of some partnership interests.
39
Over the past several years, Tax Notes has included numerous 
articles and documents concerning ongoing IRS and taxpayer disputes, 




For the discussion and recommendations provided for groups and 
their outside auditors, see Kelly, Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting: 
Effectively Connected Income and Financial Statement Risks,” supra note 
3, and Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures: Making Ethical 
Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” supra note 3. The latter article proposes 
an ethical benchmark that multinationals can use to objectively test the 
propriety of their profit-shifting structures.
